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Personnel economics drills deeply into the firm to study human resource management practices like
compensation, hiring practices, training, and teamwork. Many questions are asked.  Why should pay
vary across workers within firms--and how "compressed" should pay be within firms? Should firms
pay workers for their performance on the job or for their skills or hours of work?  How are pay and
promotions structured across jobs to induce optimal effort from employees?  Why do firms use teams
and how are teams used most effectively?  How should all these human resource management practices,
from incentive pay to teamwork, be combined within firms?  Personnel economics offers new tools
and new answers to these questions.
In this paper, we display the tools and principles of personnel economics through a series of models
aimed at addressing the questions posed above.  We focus on the building blocks that form the foundation
of personnel economics: the assumptions that both the worker and the firm are rational maximizing
agents; that labor markets and product markets must reach some price-quantity equilibrium; that markets
are efficient or that market failures have introduced inefficiencies; and that the use of econometrics
and experimental techniques has advanced our ability to identify underlying causal relationships.
Edward P. Lazear














Personnel economics drills deeply into the firm to study human resource management 
practices like compensation, hiring practices, training, and teamwork. Many questions are asked.  
Why should pay vary across workers within firms—and how “compressed” should pay be within 
firms? Should firms pay workers for their performance on the job or for their skills or hours of 
work?  How are pay and promotions structured across jobs to induce optimal effort from 
employees?  Why do firms use teams and how are teams used most effectively?  How should all 
these human resource management practices, from incentive pay to teamwork, be combined 
within firms?  Personnel economists offer new tools to analyze these questions—and new 
answers as well.  
In the not-too-distant past, the typical textbook on human resources management would 
often eschew generalization, arguing that each situation is different. The economist’s approach is 
the opposite.  Rather than thinking of each human resources event as separate and institutionally 
driven, economists place a premium on identifying the underlying general principles, and on 
using specific institutional details to identify the causal sources of the general principles. Four 
primary building blocks from economics form the foundation of personnel economics: First, 
personnel economics assumes that both the worker and the firm are rational maximizing agents, 
seeking utility and profits.  Of course, the economic approach allows for constraints or 
imperfections, such as imperfect information and transaction costs, and permits an individual’s 
utility to be influenced by a variety of factors such as personal identity, competition, and peer 
pressure. Second, personnel economists assume that labor markets and product markets must 
reach some price–quantity equilibrium, which provides discipline for our models. Third, 
efficiency is a central concept of personnel economics. In the many circumstances in which 
inefficiencies arise, the economist pushes the analysis to another level by asking where 
equilibrating market forces might have failed, and asking what actions firms and/or workers 
might take to reduce the inefficiency. Fourth, personnel economists emphasize the use of 
econometrics and experimental design to identify underlying causal relationships.  For example, 
some firms observe that if the firm moves to piece rate pay, productivity rises.  However, it turns 
out that piece rate pay induces the most productive workers to join the firm, as well as changing 
the productivity of existing workers.    4
During the last 25 years, as personnel economics has emerged as a field, human resources 
practices have systematically changed.  For example, compensation now varies much more 
highly across individuals.  In 1974, the 90
th percentile of wage earners received about 1.9 times 
the hourly wage of the 50
th percentile, but this multiple has risen steadily over the last three 
decades and has now reached about 2.3. Meanwhile the ratio of the hourly wage paid to the 50
th 
percentile of wage earners compared to the 10
th percentile rose somewhat from about 1.9 in 1974 
to 2.1 over the next three decades, but since then has sagged back to a ratio of about 2.0. In other 
words, wage inequality has risen markedly mainly because the upper tail of high earners has 
grown (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2006, forthcoming).  This rising variance of pay has occurred 
within occupations and across occupations.  The variance of pay has also risen within firms and 
across firms.   
  The rising variance of pay across individuals surely reflects changing demand for skills, 
but also is likely to reflect changes in human resource practices.  Compensation has shifted 
towards pay-for-performance. The proportion of employee’s pay that comes from bonuses rather 
than from base salary has increased.  Table 1A shows that the share of large firms that have more 
than 20 percent of their workforce working with some form of individual incentives, like a 
performance bonus, has grown from 38 percent to 67 percent.  The percent of firms using any 
form of “gain-sharing” or group-based incentives has grown from 26 percent to 53 percent.   
Teamwork has become prevalent in many firms.  Firms reported pronounced increases in 
teamwork since the 1980s, as shown in Table 1B. From 1987 to 1996, the share of large firms 
that have more than 20 percent of their workers in problem-solving teams rose from 37 percent 
to 66 percent.  The percent of large firms with workers in self-managed work teams rose from 27 
percent to 78 percent.   Team use seems to have reached a plateau in the later 1990s, but it’s a 
high-level plateau.   
  Personnel economics is aimed at modeling firms’ use of optimal management practices 
that have contributed to these trends.  In what follows, we examine topics that have become 
fixtures of personnel economics and attempt to demonstrate how the notions of maximization, 
equilibrium, efficiency, and econometric modeling have enabled economists to further the 
understanding of human resources management. 
 
   5
Promotions and Raises 
 
In many large corporations with hierarchical management structures, wages show 
discrete jumps between levels of the hierarchy, rather than continuous increases.  For example, 
Jack Welch left General Electric in 2001, when he earned $4 million in base pay as chief 
executive officer. He was succeeded by Jeffrey Immelt, who earned $2.75 million in base pay in 
his first year as chief executive office. But in the previous year, Immelt had been a vice president 
earning $1 million (General Electric Corporation, 2001). Why did Immelt’s value to the 
company more than double from one day to the next? The annual reports of public companies are 
rife with comparable examples in which a job promotion at the upper executive levels brings a 
very large salary increase. 
In standard human capital theory, wages are determined by skills, and no conceivable 
story would allow Immelt’s skills to increase dramatically a few minutes before he was promoted. 
Yet this flies in the face of common patterns of managerial compensation. It appears that jobs 
themselves—particularly high-level management jobs—play a large role in determining the 
wages of the jobholder. When Immelt took the top job at General Electric, reports stated that “the 
Welch protégé won a valuable prize” and Welch agreed that “He got a hellava raise, I’ll tell you 
that” (“GE’s Talent Agency,” Time, December 3, 2000).  Analogously standard notions of 
competition do not seem to work in this context either. Why didn’t the other strong candidates 
for the chief executive officer job offer to work for wages much lower than those currently being 
paid to Immelt, bidding down his wage to close to his previous level?  
Something else must be going on. Tournament theory, as it has come to be called, 
provides an integrated theory of compensation at different levels of the hierarchy (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). It addresses how pay raises 
are associated with promotions and argues that these compensation levels are not necessarily 
linked with a naive notion of productivity. However, productivity in a broader sense does 
influence compensation and is in part determined by it, through an incentive structure. At its 
heart, tournament theory makes the point that promotions are a relative gain. Individuals are 
promoted not on the basis of their absolute performance, but on the basis of their relative 
position in the organization. Furthermore, the compensation at one level does not necessarily 
serve to motivate individuals currently working at that level, but instead motivates all of those   6
below that level who strive to be promoted. The theory reconciles directly the initial puzzle that 
individuals are promoted to jobs and then receive wages associated with those jobs that seem out 
of line with their previously recognized skill levels. 
Tournament theory begins with the notion that prizes are fixed in advance. In other words, 
wages are associated, to a first approximation, with jobs rather than with the individual who 
holds the job. A vice president who is promoted to president receives the salary of a president—
even when that salary is considerably different from the salary previously received. Winning that 
salary depends on relative performance. Individuals are promoted not because they are good, but 
because they are better than others within the relevant group. Promotion is a statement about 
relative position within the firm, not necessarily about absolute performance. The best worker 
receives the promotion even if many of the other workers are excellent. 
The larger the pay spread between promotions, the larger the incentive to put forth effort. 
Consider a tennis match where winner and loser both receive the same prize. There is no doubt 
that individuals generally prefer to win, because pride and other factors may be involved. But 
winning becomes more important if the winner’s prize is significantly larger than the loser’s 
prize. In tennis, players may practice harder, forego other competitions, or just focus more on 
winning when the prize difference is greater. Similarly, in a corporate hierarchy, a large 
difference between the salary of the president and the vice president makes vice presidents more 
interested in becoming president, and they put forth considerable effort to get to that job. 
Similarly, at lower levels of the hierarchy, newly minted MBAs, lawyers, and assistant 
professors work extremely hard so that they can be promoted, or make partner, or obtain tenure. 
Accounting firms, law firms, and large corporations all motivate their managerial employees at 
least in part by the hope of promotion. 
The tournament model also sets limits on the size of pay spreads. Very large pay spreads 
induce high effort, but they also create a work environment in the firm that is not very pleasant. 
If individuals are working at a very high level of intensity—say, 80–90 hours a week—it will be 
necessary to compensate those employees at a very high level. At some point, the additional cost 
to sustain that level of effort will not be justified by the output. In addition, individuals who are 
competing with one another can either seek to outperform others, or they can contribute to the 
failure of others. Such incentives can result in collusion (Dye, 1984) or in sabotage (Lazear,   7
1989). Thus, pay structure must strike a balance between providing incentives for effort and 
reducing the adverse consequences associated with this kind of industrial politics. 
Outsiders can change the nature of internal tournaments.  If workers must compete not 
only with their coworkers, but also potentially with those employed in other firms, incentives are 
diluted.  Chan (1996) argues that this is why firms tend to give preference to insiders over 
outsiders.  Outsiders are hired only when they are substantially better than insiders.  The 
evidence is that those hired from the outside move on a faster track than the typical insider at the 
same position. 
Of course, chief executive officers currently receive a significant portion of their 
compensation in the form of bonuses or stock and stock options.  When Jack Welch retired as 
chief executive office of General Electric in 2001, his annual bonus was $12.5 million.  During 
Immelt’s first year as chief executive officer, his bonus was $3.5 million.  This pattern is 
consistent with tournament theory because for chief executive officers who are already at the top 
rung of the hierarchical ladder, relative compensation cannot serve as their motivation. Because 
the output of a chief executive officer is the profitability of the firm, stock and stock options are 
a reasonable metric of their output: in effect, chief executive officers switch from tournament-
like pay to piece rate pay (Rosen, 1986). 
Tournament theory has significant empirical support. The structure of wages within firms 
and their patterns of promotion are generally consistent with tournament theory (DeVaro, 2006; 
Eriksson, 1999). The structure of prizes does seem to have a direct effect on the level of effort or 
resources devoted to an activity. For example, Knoeber and Thurman (1994) show that the size 
of the spread affects output in the broiler chicken industry. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) 
were among the first to show that effort was responsive to prizes by looking at the scores that 
golfers obtained in contests. In experimental work, subjects behave almost exactly as tournament 
theory would suggest (Falk and Fehr, 2006). Drago and Garvey (1998) use a sample of 
Australian firms to show that when promotion incentives are strong, individuals put more effort 
into their jobs (as measured by absenteeism), but are also less likely to work cooperatively. 
For explaining the large discrete jumps in compensation that accompany major 
promotions, tournament theory is pretty much the only game in town. It has stood the test of 
empirical evidence, it has not been displaced by other theories, and it is consistent with common 
sense and standard business vernacular.  Indeed, the competition for the job of chief executive   8
officer at General Electric largely came down to three individuals: Jeffrey Immelt, Bob Nardelli, 
and Jim McNerney. When Immelt got the job, Nardelli went to Home Depot and McNerney to 
3M. When asked later about the competition for the General Electric top job, Bob Nardelli said 
“Look, you don’t get to these jobs without being competitive.  Any CEO will harbor that 
competitive spirit.  It’s not against Jeff [Immelt] or Jim [McNerney]. You want to win.  You 
don’t want to win at their expense, you just want to win” (USA Today, 2007). This language 
certainly sounds like someone who recognizes his own participation in a competitive tournament.  
 
 
Choice of Compensation Structure and the Hiring and Retention of Employees  
 
 
In some firms, most workers are paid a salary.  In other firms, bonuses or performance 
pay are a big portion of compensation.  A survey done by Payscale.com looked at median salary 
and bonuses for a sample of occupations in a major metropolitan area. The median bonus for 
administrative assistants, social workers, and nurses is a small percentage of total 
compensation—less than 2 percent. The median bonus of a salesperson is $30,000 for 
nonpharmaceutical sales and almost $40,000 for pharmaceutical sales.  The median salaries of 
these types of salespersons are $44,000 and $58,500, respectively, roughly on par with the 
median registered nurse’s salary.  For salespersons, bonuses make up over 40 percent of total 
compensation.  Pay on the basis of output also extends to much more highly paid jobs, such as 
investment bankers, who are paid for the performance of the merger they just achieved, or hedge 
fund managers, who are paid for the performance of the fund they manage.  For executive-level 
positions such as senior vice presidents and chief executive officers, the portion of compensation 
paid in bonuses is even larger, and in fact bonuses often far exceed base salary.  
Why do some jobs pay workers an hourly wage or salary and other jobs pay based on the 
workers’ performance?   Clearly, part of the answer lies in our examples: it is easier, or less 
costly, to measure the output of salespeople than nurses.  While the cost of measuring output is 
important in our model, we will tie it to other key features of employment that build on the 
concepts of equilibrating markets and rational decision makers.  We will also suggest answers to   9
some important broader questions: How should firms structure pay for optimal retention of 
workers?  How should firms avoid losing “star” workers? 
  Assume that workers in an occupation, such as a portfolio manager at a hedge fund, have 
output, q, that varies across workers in the occupation in a typical bell-curve-shaped distribution 
shown in Figure 1. Each individual’s output is initially unknown to the firm, because output is 
costly to measure.  However, the firm can measure each individual’s output at some cost.  The 
firm has two options. First, the firm can forego measurement, in which case no measurement cost 
is incurred and no information about worker ability is ever revealed.  A firm of this sort pays a 
straight salary, which must equal the average output.  Second, the firm can measure the output of 
the employees and pay workers according to their individual output, which is “pay for 
performance.” In this case, the distribution of pay matches the distribution of output, minus the 
measurement costs.    
The question is whether the firm should pay a straight salary—pay all workers on the 
basis of input and ignore individual variations in output—or pay on the basis of measured 
individual output.  Thus, workers will be willing to come to a piece rate firm if and only if their 
expected pay in a setting of piece rates with measurement exceeds their pay in a setting of salary 
without measurement. The key is for a firm to choose the human resources practices—pay-for-
performance versus salary—based on the firm’s ability to attract the “right” workers for the firm.    
This model provides several important results.   
A first implication of this model is that firms will pay for performance when it is cheaper 
to measure performance.  When measurement costs are low, good workers will demand that their 
output be measured.   For example, hedge fund trading is cheap to measure—success is readily 
quantifiable and relatively near term—so if one firm pays all traders the same mean wage, the 
best traders will leave to work for a firm that does pay for their performance (or will start their 
own firm).  In Figure 1, the best workers, in area A, will leave the hedge fund firm if the firm 
pays an average wage rather than using pay for performance. In contrast, in commercial banking, 
it takes years for portfolios to mature, so firms pay average wages for input, such as hours at the 
loan desk.
1 This model is about self-selection, or “fit.”  Those people who have the skills for 
                                                           
1 There are other dimensions of output, such as client relations and business development.  Sometimes, 
compensation schemes build in bonuses for superior performance along these dimensions.  Furthermore, revenue is   10
hedge fund trading, such as working under pressure to perform, will gravitate towards this 
occupation when it does pay for performance.  In contrast, individuals who excel at working with 
loan customers will head towards commercial banking.  In this case, the firm pays a salary, and 
then must screen using interviews, experience, and education, as signals of talent. Alternatively, 
if the costs of firing are low, firms will hire a range of workers in the full distribution of Figure 1, 
then fire for poor performance (Lazear, 1986). Ultimately, one advantage of pay based on 
measured output is that individuals who are not well suited to the required tasks are provided 
information that allows them to engage in an alternative activity.  
The lower the cost of measuring output, the greater the likelihood that pay is a function of 
output.  If we look at pay by occupation, we see that pay for output does rise with our general 
notion of the ease of measuring output.  Empirical research confirms this: Brown (1990) and 
Drago and Heywood (1995) show that piece rates are less common when monitoring costs are 
higher, a finding in line with the theoretical prediction. (However, Brown (1992) shows that 
salaried workers whose salaries are tied to supervisor ratings, do not earn more than their 
unsupervised colleagues, in contrast to the theoretical prediction.) We would also expect that, if 
the cost of measuring output is decreasing over time—due to information technologies, for 
example—then more firms should pay for performance.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that these 
patterns hold true, although more systematic analysis remains to be done (Andersson, Freedman, 
Haltiwanger, Lane, and Shaw, 2006). 
A second implication of this model is that firms are more likely to pay for performance as 
the worker’s alternative wage offers approach the value at the current firm. When a worker has 
alternative high-paying jobs, it is important for the firm to pay the worker for what they produce 
or the firm will lose the worker. One example is job-hopping in Silicon Valley (Fallick, 
Fleischman, and Rebitzer, forthcoming).  In the earlier years, computer programming skills 
would often be firm-specific (as for Oracle or Microsoft).  As Silicon Valley developed, and 
markets thickened, many firms could now make use of what were once firm-specific skills, and 
mobility rose. More mobility is consistent with fewer firm-specific skills.  It also implies that 
wages should be more variable across workers in the new environment. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not profit, so incentives are sometimes made product-specific to prevent salespeople from selling high-price, low-
margin goods. 
   11
This insight has implications for attracting and retaining workers. Workers with firm-
specific human capital will find that current productivity is likely to be much greater than their 
alternative productivity in another job, and so they are less likely to be paid on the basis of 
output. Being paid for individual performance is also more likely to occur when a worker is 
young, before a great deal of specific human capital is acquired.  Thus, the best time to sort 
workers is when they are young.  As a corollary, senior people in the firm are less likely to be 
measured.  Tenure reviews and decisions to promote to partner take place early in careers for this 
reason.   
  Third, as the lower tail in the distribution of worker quality like Figure 1 gets larger, 
performance pay is more likely to be optimal.  A larger lower tail means that the value of 
weeding out low quality workers rises.  
Thus far, we have emphasized how the choice between pay for performance and salary 
leads to selection and sorting among workers. Conversely, we have ignored the possibility that 
paying for performance can induce people to work harder.  Naturally, economists have also 
emphasized that some people are likely to work harder when there are tangible rewards. Workers 
with a high disutility of effort relative to their output will avoid firms that pay for performance.   
Workers are heterogeneous—those who value intrinsic internal motivation more than extrinsic 
rewards will gravitate towards jobs with salary or wage-based pay:  not everyone would enjoy 
the risk and rewards and work environment of being a hedge fund manager. This feature could 
be added to the model above, and it would introduce additional issues that we will not expand 
upon here.  Nonetheless, we can look in the data to see if pay-for-performance raises output.   
The likelihood that pay-for-performance will encourage more effort raises some 
questions about identifying causal relationships carefully. For example, hedge fund managers 
earn more than do commercial bankers. Since hedge fund managers have a larger portion of 
income paid in incentive pay, an unwary human resources person might conclude that paying for 
output makes workers more productive. However, putting in place an output-based pay plan for 
commercial bankers might well provide only very limited results.  
Why might this be the case?  First, it takes time for those who are best at selling loans to 
switch to those jobs. Thus, productivity gains from moving to a commission-based system for 
loan officers may be smaller in the short run than in the long run. Second, measuring the 
performance of commercial bankers may prove tricky. For example, a bank that sets pay based   12
on the number of loans may find that the rate of loan defaults increases. If a number of those 
defaults happen only several years into the future, the commercial bank may find itself better off 
just paying salary. Third, loan officers may never be as productive as investment bankers, 
because successful investment bankers produce a higher dollar value-added (or productivity) per 
unit of effort than do commercial bankers. In keeping with the higher productivity of investment 
banking, the firm must hire more highly talented people as investment bankers, and pay them 
more. If a human resources manager does not consider such selection effects, the gains from 
implementing an incentive pay program may be much lower than expected.   
What do the data tell us?  Performance pay is used to induce selection by workers into the 
right jobs.  For example, Lazear (2000) provides an example of a firm that installs windshields: 
individual workers drive their trucks to customers with damaged windshields and install new 
windshields. When the firm switches from hourly pay to piece rate pay, the average daily 
productivity goes from two windshields to three.  Some of the increase would be due to the 
rewards for performance.  About half probably comes from selecting workers who can respond 
to those incentives (by exerting more effort) and about half from selecting workers who can 
respond to those incentives with high effort or talent.   
Numerous other studies find performance gains and selection effects from performance 
pay. Other evidence exists on how workers respond when presented with varying compensation 
schemes. Asch (1990) presents evidence that Navy recruiters vary their recruitment effort in 
response to incentives. Using data on jockeys, Fernie and Metcalf (1999) show that incentive 
contracts generate superior performance to other, noncontingent payment systems. Using an 
experiment in a tree-planting firm, Shearer (2004) shows a productivity gain of around 20 
percent when worker compensation was switched from a fixed wage to a piece rate system.  
Freeman and Kleiner (2005) do find that productivity falls when switching from piece rates to 
salary pay, but profitability rises because performance pay undermines other goals, such as   
lowering inventories.  Similarly, Lo, Ghosh, and Lafontaine (2006) show that salesmen of 
industrial products are offered contracts with piece rate pay in part to increase personal 
performance and in part to induce the selection of salespeople who respond well to that type of 
contract. In a survey of firms across industries, Parent (1999) documents the existence of an 
incentive effect whereby men who are paid a piece rate are induced to work harder/more 
efficiently.    13
Thus, personnel economics provides implications for the structure of pay across 
occupations and experience levels. The choice between pay-for-performance and salary is 
determined by concerns of economic efficiency in different employment settings, including the 





  Another element of the choice of compensation is whether, within a firm, the firm’s 
pattern of pay for individuals should have less variance than does individual performance. No 
systematic data exists on individual output, so no one knows whether pay is generally more 
compressed than output within firms.
2    Nevertheless, managers and human resource 
professionals within firms do have a sense that pay is more compressed than output, and often 
ask the question, how compressed should pay be?  
The often-stated objective of a more compressed pay structure is to make pay more 
equitable.  People do seem to value equity or fairness in pay (Baron and Kreps, 1999).  However, 
fairness is a slippery concept.  Is it fair to pay all workers the same amount, or does fairness 
require that workers are paid in proportion to their output?  What if output results from inherent 
differences in ability rather than choice about effort?  If endowed ability is viewed as luck, 
should firms ignore these differences?  If some firms did ignore differences in innate ability, 
what would happen in a competitive market where other firms that do pay on the basis of ability 
attract the most able workers and thereby lower costs relative to the compressed wage firms?  
There are a number of reasons to believe that some degree of pay compression is an 
efficient market outcome.  For example, perhaps a greater degree of equity or fairness produces 
higher productivity, perhaps through greater teamwork. This trade-off will vary across firms.  
For example, in firms with more team-based work, pay should be more compressed for 
                                                           
2 The evidence on this is sketchy because pay and productivity are rarely measured in the same data set.  The theory 
and popular literature on this are somewhat schizophrenic. In one paper, Frank (1985) argues that pay is compressed 
relative to productivity.  Years later, Frank (1996) argues that pay is spread out too much because of the winner-
take-all nature of pay in some occupations. In one dataset that has productivity and wage data, the variance in 
productivity is smaller than the variance in pay (Lazear, 1999b).   14
numerous reasons: equity is more relevant in close comparisons, and individual output that 
would attract an outside wage offer is more difficult to disentangle from group results.   
  In the tournaments model above, workers may distinguish themselves not only by making 
themselves look good, but also by making their rivals look bad.  When pay or other forms of 
rewards are based on relative performance, cooperation is discouraged as workers try to outshine 
their competition.  To reduce the incentives to undermine coworkers, pay compression becomes 
part of optimal contracts. In general, pay compression reduces the incentives to engage in 
sabotage or other noncooperative behavior that is induced by the prisoner’s-dilemma-style 
payoff structure (Lazear, 1989).   
  A related idea involves pay compression that results because workers try to influence 
their superiors (Milgrom, 1988; Prendergast, 1993).  As the gains from appearing better than 
another in the firm increase, the incentives to lobby one’s boss become greater. Pay compression 
serves to mitigate these effects.   
  Finally, pay may be compressed because it is efficient to have the firm insure workers 
against uncertain outcomes, like bad luck on the job or bad luck when sales fall due to market 
conditions.  One difficulty with this kind of insurance is that it is subject to severe moral hazard 
problems.  If workers know that they will be insured against low productivity outcomes, 
incentives to put forth effort are reduced.  
  It is difficult to test whether firms are compressing pay relative to output. If some firms 
compress pay, high-ability workers should leave those firms.  Eventually, firms with compressed 
pay will be comprised entirely of “average” or below-average workers. In Lazear and Shaw 
(forthcoming), we don’t find that that mobility rates are higher for high-wage people in firms 
with more compressed pay.  But again, the data we have does not measure ability, so firms with 
compressed pay may already lack high-ability workers. 
 
 
Hedonic Wage Analysis and Nonmonetary Job Attributes  
 
  Money isn’t everything.  Employees care about more than pay.  When asked, employees 
state that they care about flexible hours of work, comfortable working conditions, colleagues 
whom they enjoy, projects on which they enjoy working, and bosses who provide recognition   15
and mentoring.   Employees also care about the nonwage benefits, such as health insurance and 
pensions.   However, preferences for these benefits vary across workers: older workers are more 
likely to care about pension benefits or high-quality health insurance than younger ones.  The 
question is, should the firm offer more pensions, or more health insurance, or flexible hours?   
How do benefits affect the amount of base pay offered?  The hedonic model of compensation 
provides a structure for firms to use in answering these questions.   
  Benefits are often costly.  This fact is obvious in the case of pensions and health 
insurance, but even nonmonetary benefits, such as flexible work hours, can increase coordination 
costs for the firm. These benefits can also have productivity-enhancing effects: for example, 
pensions may cause productivity to rise as workers invest in more human capital and have a 
longer time horizon at the firm (Lazear, 1979), or flexibility may increase productivity as 
workers choose when best to work.  However, the hedonic model tends to focus on the cost side 
of benefits, or at least to assume that productivity enhancements from benefits do not totally 
outweigh the costs. In this setting, a trade-off arises—if the firm offers more benefits, it must 
offer less pay.  How should a firm strike the right balance between wages and benefits?  
  The key insight of the hedonic model is that a firm should offer the package of pay and 
benefits that will attract the workers it desires. The interaction between workers’ preferences, the 
firm’s cost structure, and the firm’s desire to attract employees will determine how many 
benefits to offer.   
The first and perhaps most obvious prediction of the hedonic model is that there is a 
negative trade-off between wages and “positive” job attributes, attributes like status or flexibility 
in hours of work.  
A second key prediction of the hedonic model is that each firm offers the benefits that 
will attract the types of workers that the firm values the most. Consider an example from the 
software industry. SAS is a firm that produces statistical software licensed to big corporations, 
and their product’s value comes from its very high re-licensing rate from its existing customers.  
Therefore, SAS wants software programmers who serve customers well by designing product 
upgrades that suit customer needs. To attract such programmers, SAS offers pension benefits and 
other family-friendly benefits.  In contrast, the typical firm in Silicon Valley is less likely to 
provide pension benefits.  These other software firms value software programmers who are 
younger and have the latest programming skills in new technologies.  In turn, these young   16
workers prefer high pay (and risky stock options) and state-of-the art programming projects over 
pensions.    
A market equilibrium sorts workers to their optimal match or “fit” with firms.  The firms 
that value loyalty among workers, like SAS, will offer pension benefits, and the workers who 
want stable long-term jobs will choose these firms and will give up some base salary to get the 
pension.  The firms that value the skills of a young mobile workforce will not offer pensions, and 
the young workers will choose the high pay and stock options of these firms. The model tells us 
both how much the firm should offer in benefits and why they should offer particular benefits to 
attract certain types of workers.   
Does the data support these two predictions of the model? At first glance, the data does 
not support the prediction that wages and benefits are negatively correlated.   In fact, if we look 
at typical job attributes, such as pensions, health insurance, or safe working conditions, there is a 
positive correlation between these benefits and pay.  As shown in Table 2, the percentage of 
individuals covered by employment-based health insurance rises with family income.  However, 
simple correlations are not a fair test of the hedonic model. Simple correlations always produce 
an upward bias (or positive trade-off) because in the cross-sectional sample underlying these 
correlations a person’s ability is not observed.  People of higher ability will get both higher base 
pay and higher benefits than people of lower ability.  A college-educated worker typically has 
both higher pay and benefits than a high-school educated worker, so as base pay rises, benefits 
rise.  Since worker ability differences cannot be measured solely by education, cross-sectional 
regressions always suffer from an omitted ability bias that produces the positive pay–benefit 
correlation.  
As a thought exercise, consider the sort of data needed to test for a negative trade-off 
between benefits and pay.  Collect data on one person’s job offers after they have gone to a 
broad range of firms that offer different pay packages, and see if a negative trade-off exists in 
their job offers.  The closest we can come to this thought experiment is to follow individuals over 
time as they change jobs and see if there is a negative trade-off in pay packages.  Studies of this 
type do find a small negative trade-off (Brown, 1980).   However, this approach does not fully 
solve the selection problem: after all, individuals do not choose their new jobs randomly.  The 
average software programmer in Silicon Valley who knows his pay–benefits preferences will not   17
move to SAS; thus, we never estimate the true trade-off.  Of course, that is the point of the 
model: benefits are used to cause workers to select the firm that values them the most.   
This point leads to the test of our second prediction: do firms use benefits to encourage 
workers to sort to the firm that values them the most?  The evidence shows workers sorting to 
firms based on benefits.  Oyer (forthcoming) shows that workers match to the firms that offer the 
benefits each worker values.  Stern (2004) looks at the pay of scientists and finds support for 
both predictions of the model.  High-quality scientists often take cuts in pay in order to work on 
good projects, and firms offer them the projects and pay packages they desire.  
  After the basic theory of the hedonic model was developed by Rosen (1974; see also 
Thaler and Rosen, 1976), empirical methods essential for addressing selection issues evolved, 
allowing for new tests of the model.  Methods for thinking experimentally using 
nonexperimental data improved our understanding of the hedonic model itself as well as the tests 
of it (Epple, 1987).  
Viewing seeming nonmonetary attributes of the job as having trade-offs that can be 
monetized is a major breakthrough, because it means that any model in personnel economics can 
be applied to nonmonetary rewards just as well as to monetary incentives.  For example, the 
tournaments model above, which discusses motivation in terms of prizes that take the form of 
higher salaries, can also be interpreted to refer to prizes that take the form of status or prestige, 
not money.   
Hedonic analysis as done by economists is very different from approaches taken by other 
human resources scholars. The hedonic notion that everything can be monetized is anathema to 
the approach taken by industrial psychologists. Instead, those fields tend not to think in terms of 
trade-offs, but in terms of status or identity associated with positions (March, 1999).  In these 
status or identity models, an individual may demand a particular feature of a job because it is 
consistent with his identity.   Economists certainly introduce concepts of identity as well, but 
identity is added to an equilibrium model of rational decision making (see the next subsection on 
teams below).    
  Personnel economists explicitly think in terms of substitution and trade-offs, and firms 
have begun to do so as well.  For example, for many years, most firms have had a benefits 
department that is distinct from the compensation department.  Firms had thought in terms of 
providing some market level of each job attribute, rather than thinking in terms of a total package   18
of utility for pay and for benefits.  As firms have moved towards an emphasis on human 
resources as a strategic decision, these trade-offs are increasingly recognized.  Simple evidence 
of this change is that workers are now given choices: flex benefits plans allow them to purchase 
different amounts of health care versus pay.  The hedonic model also tells us that employees will 
not be offered the full range of choices.  If the firm feels it has the right range of pension–pay 
packages to attract the workers it desires, it will not give workers additional choices.  
  In the personnel economics model, the provision of benefits and nonmonetary job 
attributes has little to do with identity or other external factors; instead, it is motivated by rational 




  Teamwork has increasingly become a way of life in many firms. From 1987 to 1996, for 
example, the share of large firms that have more than 20 percent of their workers in problem-
solving teams rose from 37 percent to 66 percent, as shown earlier in Table 1.  The percent of 
large firms with workers in self-managed work teams rose from 27 percent to 78 percent. Team 
use seems to have hit a plateau in the 1990s; but it’s a high plateau.   
  Why do so many workplaces now use teams?  Teams can be time consuming to organize 
and coordinate, and the apparent slow progress of teams is nearly proverbial.  Moreover, 
managers and team members always worry about the free-rider problem—that indolent 
individuals will free-ride on the effort of a few team members.  So why do firms use teams?  
How should teams be managed? And what types of firms are likely to gain the most from teams? 
  One reason firms use teams is that team production can be more productive than 
individuals working alone.  For example, suppose that the goal is to develop a new product.   
How should workers be organized to achieve this objective? In Figure 2, two different situations 
are depicted.  Suppose that two skills, design and operations, are needed to produce a product.   
A point in the space reflects the amount of knowledge that an individual has in each of the two 
required skills.   
In Figure 2A (the left-hand panel), individual 2 is strong on operation skills, but relatively 
weak on design skills.  Individual 3 is strong on design, but weak on operations.  If person 2 
needs to think about design, person 3 is a good person to ask.  If person 3 needs to think about   19
operations, then person 2 is a good person to ask.  If skills are distributed as in the left-hand 
panel, then team communication seems best because each person has an absolute advantage in 
one of the two skills.  With teams, it is as if each member has access the good operations skills of 
person 2 and the good design skills of person 3, rather than only their own individual endowment 
of these skills. Note also that individual 1 has no area of greatest expertise, but may be 
sufficiently cheap to make hiring this person worthwhile. 
 Suppose instead that the situation is that shown in Figure 2B.  Now, person 4 has an 
absolute advantage in both design and operations.  If person 2 has a question about design, 
person 4 is a better resource than person 3.  If person 3 has a question about operations, person 4 
is a better resource than person 2.  This setting is better-suited to a hierarchical organization, 
where person 4 is the supervisor to whom all go to consult. 
  When does the firm choose the Team versus Hierarchy?  If individuals like type 4, who 
possess an absolute advantage in both skills, are more expensive because they are rare, firms will 
choose teams. Which firm types are likely to be willing to pay for the one-dimensional experts 
shown in the left-hand panel? Maybe new technologies would be more likely be associated with 
firms consisting of teams of experts, because in new technologies, rapid evolution of information 
makes it difficult for any one person to have an absolute advantage in everything.  As 
technologies mature, very talented individuals may, over time, acquire knowledge in a multitude 
of skills, making a hierarchical structure more natural. It is also true that new technologies are 
associated with firms that introduce teamwork (Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw, forthcoming; 
Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). 
The model of teamwork introduces the importance of complementarity between the skills 
of different workers. When the design expert works with the operations expert, they produce a 
new product design that is better than the two individuals could have produced working 
independently. In other words, workers’ inputs interact multiplicatively, so that each worker’s 
marginal product is enhanced by combining effort with another worker who has different skills.   
  The figure emphasizes several features of team interaction that may be central to creating 
value in teamwork: Lazear (1999a) provides more detail. The first feature, which is especially 
clear in Figure2A, is “disjointness:” that is, the gains from team interaction are greater when 
individuals have different skills or different information.  The second feature is relevance: that is, 
the skills of team members should not only be nonoverlapping, but also relevant.  Third,   20
teamwork requires communication, which can involve both common jargon and personal 
knowledge of each other.  Communication costs are likely reduced over time as individuals learn 
to speak each others’ languages.   
  Fourth, firms that need to solve complex problems quickly should use teams; firms that 
need to check decisions should be more hierarchical. Consider an example. Coke has invested 
heavily in its brand value and the shape of its traditional bottle. Any design alteration by a 
product design team should be checked very carefully, by many bosses up the hierarchy, before 
any new design could be launched.  The example illustrates that team-based decision making is 
too costly when the bad decisions of team members can have very negative consequences for the 
firm. A generalist, such as person 4, will typically cost more than individual experts.  Generalists, 
who can check the designs of experts, should be hired as well when the value to the firm is high.   
In contrast, a new firm, with no brand value, can risk letting the team of experts decide, because 
the risk of making a poor decision is less costly to the firm.  
A variety of empirical evidence shows that teamwork can be more productive, for reasons 
based in the sources of productivity described above.   The model of worker complementarity 
within teams is supported in Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003), which found that adoption 
of teams in a garment factory increased productivity on average by 14 percent and that more 
heterogeneous teams were more productive than teams of the same ability.  Communication is 
also very important in teams.  In a study of 700 workers in steel mills, workers in the mills with a 
team-based environment reported much higher levels of communication with all peers and 
supervisors than in the hierarchical mills (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003).  Given the increased 
communication required for teamwork, teams are more productive when communication costs 
are low.  The firms that use teams the most are those that have complex problems to solve.  For 
example, in a study of steel production, Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (forthcoming) show that 
team systems produce the greatest gains and are more likely to be adopted in steel mills that have 
complicated problems to solve because their products are complex. 
  The economic approach to team configuration is motivated primarily by an emphasis on 
complementarity of skills.  Although other disciplines have loosely defined notions of 
complementary skills, the rigorous definitions of absolute and comparative advantage in 
economics provide specific implications. For example, it is not sufficient that one member has 
absolute advantage in a certain skill.  It is necessary to understand the equilibrium wage   21
differentials across individuals of different types to know whether one form of organization like 
hierarchy dominates another form like team production.   
  The U.S. economy has seen pronounced changes in the pricing of skills coinciding with 
the rise of teamwork.  Since 1987, as discussed earlier, wage inequality has risen markedly, 
specifically the gap between the pay of workers at the 90
th percentile of the wage distribution and 
the median worker has grown yearly (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2006).  In short, the wages of 
highly skilled “star” workers have grown relative to the typical employee (Anderson, Freedman, 
Halhwanger, Lane, and Shaw, 2006).  Are these stars experts, like persons 2 and 3 in Figure 2, or 
generalists, like person 4?   Perhaps both.  Experts are highly valued: the inequality of wages has 
risen within very narrowly defined occupations.  General skills are also valued:  the underlying 
skill that is rising in demand (and pay) is “cognitive nonroutine problem solving skills” across all 
occupations (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003).  We do not have national data that combines 
information on firms’ use of teams and the skills and wages of their employees. The data does 
suggest that firms are increasingly comprised of problem-solving experts, and firms are 
increasingly team-based.   
 
 
The Complementarity of Human Resource Management Practices and Organizational 
Transformation 
 
Firms are changing their human resources practices toward more incentive pay and more 
teamwork.  Yet some managers report that their experiments with new practices have failed (for 
examples in the steel industry, see Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997).  Are there general 
principles that managers can follow that are more likely to produce successful results when they 
implement these practices?   
    When a new practice is introduced, it often requires supporting practices to be 
successful.  For example, teams are more productive when workers are better trained, or are 
given team-based incentive pay, or are selected carefully for skills that are complementary.  If 
the firm does not introduce all practices, the teams may well fail to produce higher output.   
Human resources practices can be complements, in the sense that doing more of one of them 
increases the returns to doing more of the others.  Economists and noneconomists both   22
emphasize the value of complementary practices (for example, Baron and Kreps, 1999; Pfeffer, 
1994). Thus, when firms consider alternative human resource management practices, such as 
teamwork or incentive pay, they would be wise to consider the value of the collective set of 
practices rather than the value of individual practices. 
Empirical evidence supports the claim that greater value can be obtained from 
introducing a set of complementary practices than from introducing individual human resources 
practices.  Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) gather data from four systems of human 
resource practices that are used in 35 steel mills.  The mills that introduce a complete system of 
innovative practices—such as group-based incentive pay, teamwork, careful hiring, high 
communications with workers, implicit job security, extensive training, and job flexibility—are 
substantially more productive than the mills that introduce a very limited set of teams.  
Many other examples of the importance of complementary practices prevail (Roberts, 
2004).  Southwest Airlines uses a set of labor practices that focus on teamwork, training, and 
careful hiring that seem to result in a set of satisfied customers and fast turnaround time for 
planes.  When traditional airlines attempt to compete with Southwest and fail, it is most likely 
because large airlines cannot introduce the entire set of practices that would mimic Southwest 
(O’Reilly, 1995).  
Because human resources practices form complementary sets, in optimizing production, 
the choices firms have before them look like a mountain range—there are local peaks in output 
with valleys between them. In a traditional production function, firms increase labor to move up 
the peak towards the highest output, then hit diminishing returns to labor and slide down the side 
of the mountain.  Instead of choosing amounts of labor, firms are choosing sets of 
complementary labor practices (Roberts, 2004).  One peak in output arises when the firm 
chooses the complementary set of traditional labor practices: close monitoring of workers, little 
problem-solving, and workers doing their jobs alone.  If the firm then introduces teams, output 
may fall, as this takes time away from production but does not raise output.  The firm enters a 
valley, and does not get to another, perhaps higher, peak until it combines the entire set of 
practices that support teams.  In the real world with adjustment costs, firms can’t always make 
leaps from peak to peak, and may get trapped in a valley in the short run.  Therefore, when firms 
change their human resource practices, they must know their ultimate goal and take the risk of a   23
short-term fall in output. Moreover, individual managers cannot be given the power to make 
marginal changes in human resources practices.   
Returning to the evidence from the steel industry, Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) show that 
steel mills rarely make big leaps to highly innovative practices, despite the evidence that the sets 
of innovative practices are ultimately successful.  More broadly, Baron and Hannan (2002) 
follow about 200 start-up companies as they choose their human resources practices and change 
their practices over time.  The evidence showing that firms form sets of complementary practices 





  For most of the last century, personnel, later called human resources management, was 
the territory of industrial psychologists and those who studied organizational behavior.  But in 
the 1970s, economists began to bring the formalism and rigor of economic thinking to human 
resources.  The model for personnel economics, the field that grew out of that endeavor, was 
modern finance.  Finance was historically an institutional field without much theoretical or even 
empirical underpinning until the modern developments of scholars like Merton Miller, Harry 
Markowitz, William Sharpe, Eugene Fama, Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, Robert Merton, and 
many others who followed in their footsteps.  These scholars transformed the field of finance 
into a branch of economics in large part by recognizing that a few basic principles, such as 
arbitrage, governed financial markets.  Personnel economics has followed a similar path and is 
beginning to gain the prominence that modern finance has enjoyed.   
  What does personnel economics add to traditional methods of studying human resources 
management?  Most labor economists who taught in business schools have traditionally 
encountered a disinterested audience. Traditional topics of labor supply and demand, 
unemployment, and investment in education, which are of primary concern to labor economists, 
are almost irrelevant to their business students. The issues studied by human resources specialists 
were of interest to economists, but the approach taken by the noneconomists lacked the formal 
framework to which economists have grown accustomed.  The entry of economists into the field 
of human resources management was assisted by breakthroughs in agency and contract theory,   24
which enabled economists to tackle problems that had evaded them in the past.
  Entry was further 
assisted by advancements in econometrics, including ways of addressing sample selection bias, 
omitted variable bias, and endogeneity, as well as by the use of panel data, which allowed 
economists to formulate and test models in a way that closely approximated experiments in the 
use of alternative human resource management practices. 
In providing guidance to firms in the choice of their human resource management 
practices, several themes have emerged. Many of the models emphasize the importance of “fit.”  
Firms and workers achieve fit when a worker’s skill set, broadly understood, is matched to the 
firm that values it the most. Workers, or potential employees, have very heterogeneous skills and 
preferences. Because measuring the output of individual workers is often difficult, it becomes 
especially important to think about the incentives workers face.  Pay for performance may not 
just induce the higher effort levels, but may also induce workers to select the firm that is the best 
fit for their skills, effort, and tastes.   Personnel economics emphasizes the importance of human 
resources practices for inducing workers’ self-sorting to firms.      
Better fit or performance is achieved when complementary people are matched to each 
other within the firm, or when complementary human resources practices are matched to each 
other.  People are complements when the skills of one enhance those of another within their team.  
Human resources practices are complements when one practice—such as teamwork—is 
combined with another practice—such as group-based incentive pay—such that together they 
raise output more than would either practice independently 
Alfred Marshall’s ([1890] 1961) famous statement that it is not the economist’s business 
to tell the brewer how to brew beer has not been adhered to when it comes to personnel 
economics.  Personnel economists, at least in their interactions with business students and 
practitioners, are attempting to use the tools of economics to understand, and even sometimes to 
guide, practices.  
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Note: Without measuring individual output (q), the firm pays wage1, which is the mean of output 
across all workers.  After incurring fixed measurement costs, the firm pays all individuals the 
distribution of wages labeled wage2.  If the firm does not bear these measurement costs, the best 
workers in area A will leave the firm for other firms that do measure their individual output.   
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Table 1 
Human Resource Management Practices in Large Firms 
 
 
A: Incentive Pay    
 

























1987  83  38  26    7  40  15 
1990 90  45  39  11  51  17 
1993 90  50  42  16  60  23 
1996 91  57  45  19  72  22 




                                                                          % of firms with . . .  
 teams 





20% or more 
in self-
managed teams 
more than 20% 
given team-
building skills 
1987  70 37 27     7 54 
1990  86 51 47 10 55 
1993  91 65 62 20 75 
1996  94 66 78 32 78 
1999  84 61 72 28 76 
 
Source: Lawler, Mohrman, and Benson, (2001), Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford (1995). 
 




Percentage of Individuals Covered by Employment-Based Health Insurance 
(by family income) 






total     
 
Whites  
   All Whites  240,909  147,367  0.61       
   <$25,000    52,424    11,996  0.23       
   $25,000–$49,000    59,753    32,561  0.54       
   $50,000–$74,999    46,360    34,111  0.74       
   $75,000 or more    82,372    68,699  0.83       
            
Blacks 
  All Blacks  36,965  18,003  0.49       
  <$25,000  14,578    3,156  0.22       
  $25,000–$49,000    9,944    5,483  0.55       
  $50,000–$74,999    5,844    4,042  0.69       
  $75,000 or more    6,599    5,322  0.81       
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2006, Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement. 
 
 
 